An article in The Nation describes how the U.S. may have stumbled near a solution to the civil war in Iraq.  How?  By doing everything wrong.  We have, completely unintentionally, sparked nationalism among various Iraqi factions, thus begetting a unity among them which could conceivably lead to our withdrawal.  Three American actions helped spawn the newfound alliances among erstwhile enemies in Iraq. 

The first was Joe Biden’s senate resolution to partition Iraq into three mini-states.  That passed the senate 75-23 on September 26th.  The second factor was the killing of seventeen Iraqis in a crowded Baghdad square by trigger-happy Blackwater security forces.  Third has been the continuing American pressure to partially privatize Iraq’s oil.  This last element was too vividly illustrated for Iraqis when a Texas pal of Bush’s, Ray Hunt, obtained an illegal contract with Kurds giving him rights to much of their oil.  Any one of these factors would have sparked Iraqi outrage, but taken together they have sparked more than outrage:  they have sparked collective action.

The Biden resolution sparked near-apoplectic outrage among vast swaths of Iraqis. The Cabinet declared, “The Iraqi government categorically rejects the resolution.” The Iraqi Parliament voted to condemn it. “Iraq is not a US property,” said a spokesman for the Sunni-led National Dialogue Front.

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Meanwhile, the Blackwater massacre brought into sharp focus what, for Iraqis, has been one of the ugliest parts of the occupation: the arrogant behavior of the US diplomatic and military convoys in the streets of the capital. At best, these cowboy convoys are a painful reminder that the country is occupied, as they set up arbitrary roadblocks, speed through oncoming traffic in the wrong lanes and routinely smash through stopped or parked vehicles. At worst, they engage in criminal assaults against civilians. The most recent Blackwater incident crystallized a long-simmering resentment that has touched off a showdown between the Iraqi government and US authorities. Even subservient Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki declared that Blackwater is “unfit to stay in Iraq.”

The Hunt Oil deal with the Kurds, one of several pending oil contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars, may have put the last nail in the coffin of the US effort to force Iraq to rewrite its oil laws. Like the Biden resolution and the Blackwater shooting, the Hunt deal unleashed pent-up anger among Iraqi Arab leaders, who called the deal illegal, since under current Iraqi law only the central government in Baghdad, not the Kurds, can approve oil deals. The nationalization of Iraq’s oil in 1972 by Saddam Hussein, after a decades-long struggle between Iraq and the Anglo-American oil cartel, was a landmark event, the first major oil nationalization in the region since the Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh took over the British oil interests there and, for his efforts, was toppled in 1953 by a CIA-engineered coup inspired by that cartel. In Arab Iraq, if not in Kurdistan, the national oil industry is sacrosanct. If the United States intended to confirm Iraqis’ belief that the invasion was about grabbing their country’s oil, the US effort to open up the industry to foreign investors is perfectly designed to do so.

Not that uniting Iraqis to expel the U.S. will be any easy task.  The Iraqis who currently control Parliament are a coalition of Kurds and Shiite separatists.  They control the Iraqi army and police as well as the Interior ministry.  Perhaps even more daunting than facing down these forces is the necessity of overcoming entrenched Sunni-Shiite hatreds in this new alliance.

On the upside, though, this new bloc could likely get enough votes in Parliament to topple el-Maliki.  The alliance consists of two major Shiite factions (Muqtada el-Sadr and the Fadhila Party), the entire Sunni bloc, and secular Shiites led by former prime minister Allawi.  Furthermore, al Jaafari, a Maliki rival, is negotiating to join the alliance.  The votes he controls would put the alliance over the top, in control of Parliament. 

Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni vice-president, after announcing the formation of the group, traveled to Najaf to get Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s blessing for their efforts.  Did that register?  A high ranking Sunni asked for the blessing of the highest Shiite cleric.  That is bridge building.

What the group wants is an end to sectarian violence, an end to foreign interference (including dates certain for the departure of U.S. troops and taking back control of their own oil assets), and an end to al-Qaeda presence in Iraq.

Outside parliamentary politics, other important changes are afoot.  Sunni tribal leaders and former Baathists have formed their own coalition.  These groups, who were the instigators of armed resistance against U.S. troops, are abandoning violence in favor of political alliances.  They’re holding political talks with former prime minister, Allawi, a secular Shiite.  While such an alliance is less of a tectonic shift than a Sunni vice-president asking Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s blessing, it is still remarkable.

Among the Shiites, a major shift has taken place in dominance.  Muqtada el-Sadr and the Fadhila party have become the powers in Baghdad and southern Iraq. 

If elections were held today, Sadr and Fadhila would likely sweep the Shiite-dominated parts of Iraq, reducing SIIC and Dawa to mini-parties. Sadr has sent envoys to Sunni Arab countries, proposed a joint Sunni-Shiite effort to rebuild the Samarra mosque damaged by Al Qaeda bombers, taken part in a Saudi-backed effort in Mecca to create a Sunni-Shiite clerical dialogue in Iraq and quietly engaged in talks with Sunni and secular factions in Baghdad.

Six months ago, Sadr ordered his forces to stand down.  Just at a time when U.S. forces have decided to join with Sunni tribal leaders in getting rid of al-Qaeda, they also have a chance to cooperate with Sadr.  But the ironic part is that all these groups–including the ones we have been making some common cause with–are united most of all in wanting us out.

Even el-Maliki, installed by us and committed to keeping religious Shiites as the ruling coalition, has spoken up brazenly about getting Blackwater out of the country immediately and made it clear that U.S. control of Iraqi oil is not in the cards.  He has threatend to cut us out in favor of Iran if we continue to insist on privatization.  Furthermore, the current government has announced that Iraqis want us to leave.  They are petitioning the U.N., asking that:

the next annual renewal of the United Nations Security Council mandate for a multinational force in Iraq — the only legal basis for a continuation of the American occupation — will be the last.

The Nation sums up the situation we find ourselves in:

The Catch-22 of the American occupation is this: Iraqi nationalism is the only political force capable of uniting Sunni and Shiite Arabs and thus putting an end to the sectarian civil war, but for the past four years the United States has systematically worked to suppress nationalism.

We’ve worked to divide and conquer Iraq, but many Iraqis are apparently deciding to unite in unexpected ways.  It will be interesting to see whether they can hang together.

The fallout continues from the deadly rampage by Blackwater mercenaries against Iraqi civilians on September 16 that left at least 11 Iraqis dead. Blackwater insists that their employees fired in response to coming under attack. The Iraqis claim the Blackwater personnel were unprovoked when they opened fire on civilians at a busy traffic circle while escorting a State Department convoy through Baghdad.

The September 16 incident set off a firestorm and at one point the government of Iraq said all Blackwater personnel had to leave the country and the company had to cease operating inside Iraq. This edict did not stand and Blackwater is once again roaming the streets, terrifying the populace with their mere presence and undermining whatever the hell it is the mission is supposed to be, and sowing seeds of hostility with the populace that prompt attacks against all Americans, thereby putting American G.I.’s at heightened risk.

The DoD on Wednesday announced that the Pentagon has sent a team of investigators to Iraq to probe security contractors and their operations in Iraq. In addition, a memo was sent to the commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan reminding them that they have the prerogative to court martial mercenaries working under contract with the U.S. military if/when those mercenaries violate the Rules of Engagement that govern the U.S. military. Gates wanted to make sure that the mercenaries and commanders all understood that the military can prosecute their contractors. Gates, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, on Wednesday said he also wanted to know whether the military has the resources to investigate private security personnel under contract with the DoD for alleged crimes. “My concern is whether there has been sufficient accountability and oversight,” Gates said.

In the memo, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England told military commanders that they’re responsible for monitoring contractors under their control and charging those who violate rules of engagement.

“Commanders have UCMJ (Uniformed Code of Military Justice) authority to disarm, apprehend, and detain DoD contractors suspected of having committed a felony offense in violation of the RUF (Rules on the Use of Force),” Gordon wrote. The memo was dated Tuesday.

England said commanders should review contractors’ standard operating procedures and make any necessary changes to the way they authorize force to “minimize the risk of innocent civilian causalities or unnecessary destruction of civilian property.”

The State Department hasn’t distributed a similar memo, and it is unclear what, if any, U.S. law applies to the actions of its contractors.

So far, no Defense Department contractor has been charged under U.S. law, and no security contracts have been suspended for violations, Morrell said.

Yeah. It really is as thoroughly and completely screwed up as it sounds.

Four and a half years into Iraq, and six years into Afghanistan, they have decided it’s time to determine what, exactly, to do with mercenaries who attack and murder civilians without provocation, or otherwise commit actions that undermine the efforts of the United States to salvage something – anything – from this fiasco so we can claim some sort of semblance of a shadow of a specter of a pale imitation of victory™ and get the hell out of there.

The Iraqi Interior Ministry has sent the investigation of the incident to a magistrate and is looking at possible criminal charges, although they may be hamstrung by the ghost of Paul Bremer and the CPA, in the form of Order 17, which essentially gave mercenaries immunity to run amok, unencumbered by the rule of law.  Under Order 17, mercenaries can kill at will, with little or no fear of legal, or even civil, repercussions.

This week, Iraqi lawmakers began considering a proposal that would withdraw the provisions of Order 17 from Iraqi law and make security contractors/mercenaries accountable under the Iraqi system of justice.  Iraqis have complained bitterly for years that the mercenary army is unnecessarily aggressive and damages property with impunity and mistreats and kills Iraqis with reckless abandon. 

Point of Clarification:  The mercenaries involved in the September 16 violence were under contract to the State Department, and that incident is under joint Iraqi – State Department investigation.  DoD has no authority to investigate or try the Blackwater mercenaries involved.  Gates, being competent, and not beholden to nor under the sway of Cheney or Bush, is looking for problems before someone else finds them and uses them against him.  (I don’t like the man, but I can not help but respect the talent).  At State, on the other hand, the inept and outpaced Condi is still carrying her bosses water,  overtly and contemptuously stonewalling congressional oversight into the incident.  While the DoD does have contracts with Blackwater, the State Department outspends the DoD on Blackwater contracts  at a rate of approximately 8:1.

The private-army aspect of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been controversial since the first days in Afghanistan, and there has been no shortage of animosity between the professional military and the mercenary army.  To date, no personnel under DoD contract have been charged under U.S. law, and no contracts have been suspended for violations.  The military has been taken to task though.  Two Air Force officers were brought up on charges of assault and conduct unbecoming following a run-in between the officers and Blackwater personnel on a road outside Kabul in September 2006.  The charges were later dismissed.

 

The bloodletting two weeks ago has set up a clash between the Pentagon and the State Department.    The tensions have been long-simmering, and the events of September 16 turned up the heat.  “The military is very sensitive to its relationship that they’ve built with the Iraqis being altered or even severely degraded by actions such as this event,” said one senior military official in Iraq.  “This is a nightmare. We had guys who saw the aftermath, and it was very bad. This is going to hurt us badly. It may be worse than Abu Ghraib, and it comes at a time when we’re trying to have an impact for the long term.”

 

In interviews involving a dozen U.S. military and government officials, many expressed anger and concern over the shootings in Nisoor Square, in Baghdad’s Mansour neighborhood. Some worried it could undermine the military’s efforts to stabilize Iraq this year with an offensive involving thousands of reinforcements.

 

“This is a big mess that I don’t think anyone has their hands around yet,” said another U.S. military official. “It’s not necessarily a bad thing these guys are being held accountable. Iraqis hate them, the troops don’t particularly care for them, and they tend to have a know-it-all attitude, which means they rarely listen to anyone — even the folks that patrol the ground on a daily basis.”

 

Most officials spoke on condition of anonymity because there are at least three ongoing investigations of Blackwater’s role in the shootings. There are also sensitive discussions between various U.S. agencies and the Iraqi government over the future of Blackwater and other private security firms in Iraq.

 

Teddy Spain, a retired Army Colonel was willing to speak on the record.  “I personally was concerned about any of the civilians running around on the battlefield during my time there.  My main concern was their lack of accountability when things went wrong.”

 

Several commanding officers spoke frankly on condition of anonymity. 

 

…”Given their record of recklessness,” said the senior U.S. commander, “I’m not sure any senior military officer here would want responsibility for them.”

 

…”They are immature shooters and have very quick trigger fingers. Their tendency is shoot first and ask questions later,” said an Army lieutenant colonel serving in Iraq. Referring to the Sept. 16 shootings, the officer added, “None of us believe they were engaged, but we are all carrying their black eyes.”

 

…”Many of my peers think Blackwater is oftentimes out of control,” said a senior U.S. commander serving in Iraq. “They often act like cowboys over here . . . not seeming to play by the same rules everyone else tries to play by.”

 

…”Many of us feel that when Blackwater and other groups conduct military missions, they should be subject to the same controls under which the Army operates,” said Marc Lindemann, who served in Iraq with the 4th Infantry Division and is now an officer in the New York National Guard and a state prosecutor.

 

…”The deaths of contractors from Blackwater helped precipitate the debacle in Fallujah in 2004 and now the loss of Blackwater is causing disruptions in the war effort in 2007,” a military intelligence officer said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Why are we creating new vulnerabilities by relying on what are essentially mercenary forces?”

 

The lousy reputation Blackwater has among members of the U.S. military has led to renewed debate over whether the DoD should handle State’s security contracts.  The Department of Defense (understanding what security protocols should involve) has a more strident procedure for licensing and oversight of personnel under contract to their agency, the DoD also has more detailed incident reporting procedures when weapons are discharged.  In addition, the military investigates promptly when incidents occur or allegations are made against mercenaries in their employ. 

 

A Pentagon source insisted that “We are really making State respond, conduct an investigation and come up with recommendations.” The source said that in Washington the atmosphere surrounding the confrontation between State and the pentagon is calm and professional but, referring to Iraq, said, “There is probably a bit more emotion going on in theater.” 

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As if Blackwater needed another revelation (they are also under investigation for smuggling weapons into Iraq that ultimately ended up pointed at American G.I.’s) the New York Times reported Thursday that mercenaries from Blackwater USA have been involved in a far higher rate of shootings while guarding and escorting American diplomats than other companies providing comparable services. 

 

The rate of Blackwater violence is at least twice that of DynCorp International and Triple Canopy, the other security companies operating in Iraq.  Blackwater’s hired guns are just that, discharging weapons, on average, twice every convoy.  (The other companies frequently escort convoys completely without incident.)

“You can find any number of people, particularly in uniform, who will tell you that they do see Blackwater as a company that promotes a much more aggressive response to things than other main contractors do,” a senior American official said.  “Is it the operating environment or something specific about Blackwater?” asked one government official. “My best guess is that it is both.”

  While the bloody rampage at the Nisour traffic roundabout was the most shocking in the level of wanton killing, the modern-day Pinkerton’s of  Blackwater are under investigation in six other episodes that left ten people dead and at least 15 wounded. 

Slowly, American officials are accepting the position that Blackwater’s behavior in Iraq is counterproductive to the stated ‘mission’ by fueling resentment among the local population.

“They’re repeat offenders, and yet they continue to prosper in Iraq,” said Representative Jan Schakowsky, an Illinois Democrat who has been broadly critical of the role of contractors in Iraq. “It’s really affecting attitudes toward the United States when you have these cowboy guys out there. These guys represent the U.S. to them and there are no rules of the game for them.”

Secretary of Defense Gates was in front of Congress asking for $190 Billion for the war effort for  FY 2008.  Congress is hammering out the budget now.

While the American public may not yet be ready to cut off funding to the U.S. military for the occupation of Iraq, I seriously doubt that there would be great wailing and bleating and rending of cloth and gnashing of teeth if, just for starters, the monies in the budget allotted to Blackwater  fell victim to Congresses one true power.